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Abstract 
This paper investigates the eﬀects of signing a trade agreement on the correlations of the business 
cycle fluctuations of consumption, investment and output between two countries. We construct an 
international business cycle model with trade costs and we calibrate it to the United States and Mexico 
in order to estimate the impact of NAFTA on their co-movements. Although there exist some 
discrepancies between the theory and data in the degree of correlation, the direction of change 
corresponds to the one in the data. 
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1 Introduction
Globalization and trade agreements are very contemporary subjects and a reality aﬀecting
many economic variables. The purpose of this paper is to study the eﬀects of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) from the business cycles point of view. More explicitly, we
analyze the empirical evidence for the US-Mexico comovements before and after signing NAFTA
then we test the ability of the international business cycles model to fit the data.
One could believe that countries with stronger international trade linkages tend to have
higher correlated business cycles in consumption but less correlated cycles in investment. The
argument behind this statement is that trade integration (or signing a trade agreement) de-
creases trade costs, facilitating the trade in goods and thus making the consumption paths of
the countries involved more correlated . On the other hand a reduction in trade barriers also
means that the investment from one country could flow to the other, thus decreasing the corre-
lation. In terms of output the intuition can lead us to two diﬀerent rational scenarios. Standard
trade theory tells us that increased trade leads to more specialization. On one hand, if the
specialization induces more inter-industry trade and the shocks driving the business cycles are
sector-specific than there is no reason to think that trade intensification would lead to higher
comovements in output. On the other hand, if what is intensified is the intra-industry trade, we
can expect an increase in the comovement of outputs of the countries involved, induced by the
"back-and-forth" trade.
However, this intuition is not supported either by the empirical or theoretical literature.
Until now only the relationship between trade barriers and output comovements received direct
attention in both empirical and theoretical studies. Frankel and Rose (1998) and Imbs (2004),
among others, show that stronger trade linkages are associated with higher correlations of out-
puts in the data. Kose and Yi (2001, 2006) examine whether these patterns can be explained
by the standard international business cycle model. With the calibration they chose (for US,
Germany and Japan), the model failed to fit the data.
There is a large branch of literature that studies the economic impact of NAFTA. This liter-
ature analyses the impact of the trade agreement on the volume of trade between the countries
involved. Krueger (1999) presents empirical evidence that in the case of NAFTA, trade creation
was bigger than trade diversion. From a theoretical point of view, this analysis of the implica-
tion of NAFTA on the volume of trade is usually done using static applied general equilibrium
models based on increasing returns and imperfect competition (see Kehoe (2003) for a survey).
However, the static nature of these models makes them unfit for our purpose. To understand
the eﬀects of NAFTA on the countries’ business cycles, one needs to analyze the behavior of
macroeconomic aggregates. As Kehoe and Kehoe (1994) emphasized in their paper, accounting
for changes in productivities is vital for capturing changes in the macroeconomic aggregates.
We therefore use a business cycle model with productivity shocks to analyze the comovements
in the main economic aggregates: consumption, investment and output. Our analysis is thus
related to the international business cycle literature. The focus of this literature is on two major
discrepancies between the data and the predictions of the international business cycle models.
The international business cycle models with complete markets predict negative cross-country
correlations of investment (while in the data these correlations are positive) and cross-country
correlations for consumption much higher than for output (while in the data the opposite is
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true).1
Many economists tried to solve these so called “puzzles”, by introducing various frictions
in the international business cycle models. Among the frictions considered, the most frequent
are the transportation costs2 and incomplete financial markets.3 The expected consequences
of these frictions are a reduction in the correlations of consumption and an increase in the
correlations of output and investment. Several papers show that these frictions are able to
reduce the existing anomalies, and even completely eliminate them.4 Nevertheless these papers
focus on the US-Canada or US-Europe aggregate data and therefore their models are calibrated
for these particular situations.
The focus of the present paper is on the US and Mexico and the eﬀects of NAFTA on
these countries’ consumption, investment and output comovements. A stylized, simplified way
of incorporating trade agreements into theoretical economic models is in the form of changes in
trade costs between countries.5 Therefore we introduce a trade cost in intermediate goods in the
standard international business cycle model (a la Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (1995)) and simulate
the signing of NAFTA by a reduction in this cost. We show that a decrease in the trade cost is
able to reproduce the direction of changes in comovements but not the size.
The paper is organized as follows: we start by presenting the empirical evidence in section 2,
then set up the model in section 3. Section 4 describes the calibration of the model and section
5 presents the results. Finally, the last section concludes and presents lines for future research.
2 Empirical evidence
The objective of this section is to analyze the changes in the correlations of consumption,
investment and output for the case of USA and Mexico. Our main focus is on the patterns of the
correlations around the year 1994 when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
came into force.
Although NAFTA was signed by USA, Mexico and Canada, we present here only the empir-
ical evidence for the case of USA and Mexico while the evidence regarding the other two pairs
of countries (USA-Canada, Canada-Mexico) is presented in Appendix 2. We made this choice
for two reasons. First since USA and Canada have had intense trade-relationship even before
1994 (for example, the Canadian Free Trade Agreement signed between Canada and USA came
into force in 1989) one would not expect any strong impact of NAFTA on their macroeconomic
paths. Second, the case of Mexico-Canada is not so interesting because the volume of trade
between Canada and Mexico is only 4 percent of existing trade between US and Mexico.6
1See Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (1992) for details.
2See Mazzenga and Ravn (2002)
3See Kose and Yi (2001, 2006), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Heathcote and Perri (2002)
4See Kehoe and Perri (2002).
5Since a trade agreement represents more than a reduction in the trade barriers, this paper represents the first
step in our intent to see all the efects that trade liberalization can have over the international comovements.
6The static applied general equilibrium models also conclude that NAFTA is likely to have a strong positive
impact on the Mexican economy, only a small impact on the US economy and almost no impact on the Canadian
economy. See Kehoe and Kehoe (1994) for more details.
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Table 1 displays the evolution of the cross-country correlations of consumption, investment
and output. To compare correlations before and after signing NAFTA, we compute correlations
over equal periods of time, before and after 1994.7
TABLE 1. Mexico – USA: Empirical evidence 
 
Corr / NAFTA Before After 
corr (c1, c2) -0.28 0.32 
corr (i1, i2) -0.40 0.58 
corr (y1, y2) -0.19 0.56 
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts 
Note:  c = consumption, i = investment, y = output. All the variables are Hodrick-Prescott-filtered with a 
          smoothing parameter of 1600. 
         The periods “before” and “after” corresponds to the following quarters: 
          “before”: 1985:1 – 1993:4,  
“after”: 1994:1 – 2002:4 
          
Comparing the correlations for USA and Mexico before and after 1994 we observe a clear
increasing tendency in all the three macroeconomic variables considered. However, this ev-
idence is not enough to conclude that there is any possible impact of NAFTA. The ta-
ble above only shows that the correlations after 1994 are higher than before. This might
be just the natural consequence of a constant increase in the correlations. To eliminate
this possibility we analyze the evolution of the comovements in time by considering cor-
relations over a “flying” 5-year window. Figure 1 illustrates the correlations in time for
consumption, investment and output. The smoothed lines represent the trends of the co-
movements while the more volatile line, the fluctuations around this trend.8 The figure
shows, for all the variables, a clear change in the tendency in 1992, the year when the
Figure 1. Correlations Mexico – USA
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Appendix 3 presents data on trade and comparative statistics.
7See Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of data.
8We applied Hodrick-Prescott filter to abtain the trend and the fluctuations.
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We interpret these results as an evidence of NAFTA’s impact on the comovements between
USA and Mexico. The rest of the paper investigates the ability of the standard international
business cycle model to generate these results. The following section describes in detail the
model we use.
3 The International Business Cycle Model
We consider a standard neoclassical growth model “a la” Backus, Kehoe, Kydland (1995)
(BKK henceforth). The economy consists of two countries that produce diﬀerent, imperfectly
substitutable intermediate goods which can be traded between countries. After the trade, each
country uses as final good a combination of the domestic and imported goods. The diﬀerence
from the BKK model consists in the “iceberg” trade cost τ we introduce in this model. The
rough way in which we simulate a trade agreement in this economy is through reducing τ .
Two new features are studied here. First, we investigate how the correlations in consumption,
investment and output evolved in time after the reduction in trade cost. Second, due to the
specifics of the case we want to study, USA-Mexico, Backus et all.(1995) or Mazzenga and Ravn
(2002) ’s assumption that the equilibrium is symmetric cannot be applied. This complicates the
way the model is solved and the calibration we make in order to simulate the results. In the
following subsections we will present in more detail the model.
Preferences
Each country, i, is represented by a continuum of identical, infinitely lived agents having the
preferences characterized by the following expected utility function
ui = E0
∞X
t=0
βtiUi(cit, 1− nit) , i = 1, 2, (1)
where cit and nit represents per capita consumption and time devoted to labor in country
i and β is the intertemporal discount factor. The utility function is Ui(ci, 1 − ni) = [cµii (1 −
ni)1−µi ]1−γi/(1−γi), where µi represents the consumption share and γi the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion. The endowment of time is normalized to 1 in each period t. Therefore (1 − nit)
represents time devoted to leisure, per capita, in country i.
We denote by Ψ the relative mass of population of country 1.
Technologies
Intermediate goods
Each country specializes in the production of a single intermediate good, labeled a for country
1 and b for country 2. Production of these goods takes place in each country using as inputs
domestic capital, k, and domestic labor, n (both internationally immobile) and it is aﬀected
by the technology shocks, z. Some of the intermediate goods are used domestically for the
production of final goods while the rest is exported. This gives rise to the resource constraints:
a1t + a2t = y1t = z1tF (k1t, n1t) (2)
b1t + b2t = y2t = z2tF (k2t, n2t) (3)
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in country 1 and 2 respectively, where F (ki, ni) = k
θi
i n
1−θi
i and zit represents the productivity
shock specific to country i. The productivity shocks follow the process zit+1 = Aizit+εit+1, where
corr(Ai, Aj) 6= 0 and the innovations ε1t+1 and ε2t+1 are correlated. The variable yit represents
output per capita in country i and a2t, b1t represent the quantities exported to country 2 (good
a), respectively to country 1 (good b), also per capita.
Final goods
Consumption and investment in each country are composites of the foreign and domestic
intermediate goods:
c1t + x1t = G(a1t, b01t) (4)
c2t + x2t = G(b2t, a02t) (5)
where G(a, b) is the Armington aggregator: G(a, b) = [ω1a1−α + ω2b1−α]
1
1−α 9 and b01t, a02t repre-
sents the quantities imported by country 1 and 2 respectively. Parameters α,ω1, ω2 are positive,
σ = 1α represents the elasticity of substitution between goods a and b and ω1, ω2 represent the
home, and, respectively, foreign bias in the composition of domestically produced final goods.
The law of motion for the capital stock is given by
kjt+1 = (1− δj)kjt + xjt (6)
where δj ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate and xjt represents the amount of final good devoted to
investment in country j.
Trade cost
As we said at the beginning, we introduce a trade cost, τ ∈ [0, 1] in this economy. This cost
aﬀects international trade in intermediate goods in the following way: if a quantity q is exported,
only a fraction (1− τ) of q reaches the destination. Therefore the feasibility conditions for the
final goods could be rewritten as:
c1t + x1t = G(a1t, (1− τ)b1t) (7)
c2t + x2t = G(b2t, (1− τ)a2t) (8)
3.1 Equilibrium
Defining a competitive equilibrium for this economy with complete contingent claims markets is
straightforward but notationally burdensome. We prefer to determine the equilibrium allocations
by exploiting their welfare properties. Each country is populated by identical consumers who
will choose identical consumption and investment plans in the equilibrium. In the equilibrium
consumers use contingent claims to diversify country-specific risk across states of nature. By
doing so, consumers end up equating the marginal utility of consumption across countries for each
9This is like having the preferences defined over goods a and b. But for computational simplicity we call goods
a and b ”intermediate goods” and the aggregation of both (i.e. G(a, b)) we call it the final good.
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state of nature thus, each equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. Therefore the equilibrium
in this model is that Pareto optimal allocation in which the consumers from the same country
choose the same allocations. For this reason we can consider a representative consumer for each
one of the economies. Moreover, if we consider the continuum of agents in country 1 having the
relative mass Ψ (relative to the total of consumers in the economy), the relative mass of country
2 will be 1−Ψ.10 The equilibrium allocation under complete markets specification is thus fully
characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The allocation (a∗1t, a
∗
2t, b
∗
1t, b
∗
2t, c
∗
1t, c
∗
2t, x
∗
1t, x
∗
2t, k
∗
1t, k
∗
2t, n
∗
1t, n
∗
2t) is an equilib-
rium allocation of the economy, given the transportation cost τ , if it solves the following
problem:
max Ψu(c1t, 1− n1t) + (1−Ψ)u(c2t, 1− n2t) subject to (9)
c1t + x1t = G(a1t, (1− τ)b1t)
c2t + x2t = G(b2t, (1− τ)a2t)
Ψa1t + (1−Ψ)a2t = Ψz1tF (k1t, n1t)
Ψb1t + (1−Ψ)b2t = (1−Ψ)z2tF (k2t, n2t)
k1t+1 = (1− δ1)k1t + x1t
k2t+1 = (1− δ2)k2t + x2t
In order to figure out the decision rules in equilibrium, we solve for the deterministic steady
state of the model and approximate the dynamics of the model in response to exogenous pro-
ductivity shocks. We do so by linearizing the first order conditions around the steady state, as
described in King, Plosser, Rebelo (1988).
4 Calibration
The complete list of parameters we have to calibrate is the following: the intertemporal
discount factor βi, the consumption share in the utility function µi, the degree of risk aversion
γi, the technology coeﬃcient θi, the depreciation rate δi, the home and foreign bias in final
good production ωi1 and ωi2, the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods αi, the
persistence matrix for technology shocks A and the variance-covariance matrix of shocks V .
Some of these parameters can be estimated from the available data, others we borrow from
other papers. We will start with the last ones: the value for the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient
is taken from BKK: γ1 = γ2 = γ = 2. In the next section we run a sensitivity analysis to see
10Taking into account that we want to calibrate this model for the case of USA and Mexico, we cannot impose
the symmetry. Thus Ψ 6= 0.5
Maria Bejan
6 EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/03 © 2007 Maria Bejan
if this value match the best our predictions with the empirical evidence we have. Also we take
the discount factor to be 0.99 in both countries (the value normally used in the literature. See
BKK(1995), Kehoe, Perri(2002))
To estimate the rest of the parameters in the model we use data from OECD (Quarterly
National Accounts) for the period 1980:1-2002:4. First we estimate the time devoted to work (n)
in steady state: using the first moment approximation we obtain a share of 0.34 in USA and 0.36
in Mexico. Also from Kaldor’ stylized facts we know that ky is roughly constant. Our estimation
is: (ky )USA = 13.28, (
k
y )MEX = 11.13. The estimates for consumption shares of output are
( cy )USA = 0.66,(
c
y )MEX = 0.68.
11
To approximate the labor share we use the following formula (as in Gollin (2002)):
labor_share =
employees_compensation
nr_employees · work_force
GDP
With this approximation we obtain an average labor share of 0.64. Therefore
θ1 = θ2 = θ = 0.36.
Having these estimates and the first order conditions from above we can determine the
depreciation rates:
δ =
1− cy
k
y
⇒ δUSA = 0.025; δMEX = 0.028.
Also using first order conditions we can estimate the consumption share in the household’s
utility, µ :
µ =
1
1 + 1−θθ
1−n
c
k
n(
1
β − 1 + δ)
⇒ µUSA = 0.34; µMEX = 0.38.
We calibrate the relative mass of the countries (Ψ) such that the commercial deficit USA-
Mexico computed from the model to fit the data. In this way,Ψ = ΨUSA = 0.61, 1 − Ψ =
ΨMEX = 0.39.
Table 2 summarizes the values of the parameters used in our experiments.
11For the US we use the estimated ratios capital-to-output, consumption-to-output from Neumeyer and Perri
(2005). For Mexico, we estimate the ratios using capital, consumption and GDP series from Heathcote and Perri
(2004).
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TABLE 2. Parameter Values 
Type Name Symbol y value 
Discount Factor* 99.0=β  
Consumption share 

=
=
38.0
34.0
MEX
USA
µ
µ
 Preferences 
Curvature parameter *  2=γ  
Capital share 36.0=θ  
Technology 
Depreciation rate 

=
=
028.0
025.0
MEX
USA
δ
δ
 
* Imported from BKK 
We also consider the steady state share of imports to outputs as being constant, and we
estimate it from the available data, before and after signing NAFTA: sUSA(before) = 0.10,
sMEX(before) = 0.15, sUSA(after) = 0.13, sMEX(after) = 0.29. Using these ratios and the
above values we can calibrate the foreign bias from Armington aggregator and the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods. We obtain them as functions of τ :12
elasticity of substitution from Armington aggregator α(
1− qa1(1−s1qa1 )
α1 = qb1(
s1
qa1
)α1(1− τ)α1−1
1− qb2(1−s2qb2 )
α2 = qa2(
s2
qb2
)α2(1− τ)α2−1
weights from Armington aggregator ωij13



ω11 =
[( 1s1
−1)∗( q
a
1 (1−τ)
qb1
)
1−α
α ]−α
1+[( 1s1
−1)∗( q
a
1 (1−τ)
qb1
)
1−α
α ]−α
ω21 =
[( 1s2
−1)∗( q
b
2(1−τ)
qa2
)
1−α
α ]−α
1+[( 1s2
−1)∗( q
b
2(1−τ)
qa2
)
1−α
α ]−α
It is interesting to observe here how the elasticity of substitution and the weights each country
puts on its domestically produced good change with the intensity of the trade barriers (τ).
Higher trade barriers are associated with lower import shares, higher elasticities of substitution
and lower weights the imports receive in the final good production. We can interpret this as
a link between trade intensity and specialization: lower trade barriers generate more intensive
trade and in the same time induce a decrease in the elasticity of substitution. The intermediate
12For a more detailed example of calibation for the Armington aggregator coeﬃcients see Appendix 4.
13Gi(a, b) = [ωi1a
1−α + ωi2b
1−α]
1
1−α .
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goods of the two countries become “more” complements and this makes each country specialize
in one good.14
The last parameters we need to estimate are related to the productivity shocks processes.
First we compute the total factor productivity in each one of the countries using Solow residuals:
lnTFP = ln(y)− capital_share · ln(k)− labor_share · ln(L),
where we use the GDP for output, the stock of capital we constructed using series of investment
and we use the total number of hours worked as a measure of labor.
The last step is to eﬀectively estimate the productivity shock process:
µ
z1t+1
z2t+1
¶
=
µ
A11 A12
A21 A22
¶
∗
µ
z1t
z2t
¶
+
µ
ε1t+1
ε2t+1
¶
,
where
µ
ε1t
ε2t
¶
˜N(0,Σ).
Estimates for elements of A and Σ are presented in Table 3. Numbers in parentheses represent
standard errors.
TABLE 3. Productivity shock 
Productivity transition matrix 
 



 −=
)025.0()020.0(
)006.0()023.0(
939.0045.0
011.0951.0
A  
 
Std. dev. of innovations to productivity 

=
=
0976.0
0089.0
2
1
ε
ε
σ
σ
 
 
Correlation between innovations to productivity 276.0),( 21 =εεcorr  
 
We have now all the ingredients needed to compute the steady state, to log-linearize the
system around this steady state and then to apply the King Plosser Rebelo (1987) procedure.
5 Results
This section reports the average results across 1000 stochastic simulations. One period in
the model corresponds to one quarter in the data. Therefore, for the case of USA-Mexico we
simulate the economy over 72 periods. In Table 4 we present the result of these simulations and
compare them with what we observed in data.
14This is the missing link between trade and specialization in Kose and Yi(2001).
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In the first exercise we made, whose results we present in Table 4, we consider a decrease in
trade costs from 45% to 15%. Table 5 shows what happens with the predictions for a bigger fall
in the trade costs.
Comparing our results to the data we can see that the model performs well in predicting the
correlation in consumption: a jump from -0.18 to 0.27 in the model corresponds to the jump
observed in the data, from -0.28 before NAFTA to 0.32 after NAFTA. However, in the data the
increase is higher than what our model predicts. In terms of investment, the predicted jump is
far smaller than what we found in the empirical study. Moreover, the initial level of correlation
is bellow the data. In the case of output correlation, we observe the same smaller jump in the
predictions than in the data. However, for all the correlations, the direction of changes coincides
with the one found in the data: all the correlations increase.
Moreover, Figures 4 shows that the pattern followed by the model predictions has the same
U-shape as the data, although the curvature is much softer than in the data.
TABLE 4. Benchmark experiment 
Mexico - USA Before After 
 Data 
corr (c1, c2) -0.28 0.32 
corr (i1, i2) -0.40 0.58 
corr (y1, y2) -0.19 0.56 
 Model 
corr (c1, c2) -0.18 0.27 
corr (i1, i2) -0.72 -0.68 
corr (y1, y2) 0.21 0.35 
Note:  c = consumption, i = investment, y = output. All the variables are Hodrick-Prescott-filtered with a 
          smoothing parameter of 1600. 
         The periods “before” and “after” corresponds to 1985:1 – 1993:4, respectively 1994:1 – 2002:4. 
          
Table 5 presents the results of our simulation for a bigger fall in the trade cost, τ . We
consider the extreme case where before the trade agreement there is almost no trade between
countries (this corresponds to a trade cost τ = 0.95), then, when the trade agreement is signed,
the trade cost becomes very close to 0 (τ = 0.05). On the one hand, the results show that all
the correlations are very sensitive to changes in trade cost. On the other, all the predictions
after NAFTA are relatively far bellow what we observe in the data. This is an evidence that,
although a reduction in the trade costs is an important feature of a trade agreement, it is not a
perfect proxy for all the changes a trade agreement means.
Table 6 presents a sensitivity analysis with respect to the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion,
γ. Since we do not have any exact estimation of this parameter, it is useful to see if the results
change with diﬀerent values of the parameter and which is the value which fits the best our
predictions with the empirical evidence
Maria Bejan
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A first look at this table suggests that the correlations in investment and output follow
a clearly decreasing pattern. The dynamics of the consumption correlation is not monotonic.
There is an increasing tendency for γ ≤ 1.50 then the pre-NAFTA correlations remain more or
less constant, while post-NAFTA correlations decrease. A more detailed analysis of the results15
provides the same results: the best match between the empirical evidence and simulated results
is obtained for γ between 1.25 and 2.
Figure 4. Correlations Mexico– USA
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TABLE 5. Sensitivity analysis 
Mexico - USA Before After 
 Benchmark experiment 
corr (c1, c2) -0.18 0.27 
corr (i1, i2) -0.72 -0.68 
corr (y1, y2) 0.21 0.35 
 Huge fall in trade cost 
corr (c1, c2) -0.93 0.28 
corr (i1, i2) -0.90 -0.65 
corr (y1, y2) -0.01 0.30 
Note:  c = consumption, i = investment, y = output. All the variables are Hodrick-Prescott-filtered with a 
          smoothing parameter of 1600. 
         The periods “before” and “after” corresponds to 1985:1 – 1993:4, respectively 1994:1 – 2002:4. 
15We use as an accuracy measure for the predictions error(predictioni) =s
(cpred − creal)2 + (xpred − xreal)2 + (ypred − yreal)2 where c, x, y represents consumption, investment and
output respectively.
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TABLE 6. γ-Sensitivity analysis 
correlations corr (c1, c2) corr (i1, i2) corr (y1, y2) 
period before after before after before after 
γ=0.75 -0.54 -0.25 -0.23 0.00 0.31 0.49 
γ=1 -0.44 0.14 -0.38 -0.20 0.27 0.43 
γ=1.25 -0.28 0.38 -0.51 -0.36 0.25 0.40 
γ=1.5 -0.20 0.42 -0.60 -0.51 0.22 0.37 
γ=1.75 -0.19 0.35 -0.66 -0.59 0.23 0.36 
γ=2 (Benchmark exp) -0.18 0.28 -0.72 -0.67 0.21 0.34 
γ=3 -0.19 -0.01 -0.84 -0.83 0.20 0.31 
γ=4 -0.18 -0.14 -0.90 -0.88 0.19 0.30 
Data -0.28 0.32 -0.40 0.58 -0.19 0.56 
Note:  c = consumption, i = investment, y = output. All the variables are Hodrick-Prescott-filtered with a 
          smoothing parameter of 1600. 
         The periods “before” and “after” corresponds to 1985:1 – 1993:4, respectively 1994:1 – 2002:4. 
          
6 Conclusions and future research
The empirical evidence we have shows that the correlations in consumption, investment and
output between Mexico and the US increased after 1992, when the preparatives for signing the
North American Free Trade Agreement finished. We interpret these results as an evidence of
NAFTA’s impact on the US-Mexico comovements.
We have shown that the model provides good qualitative results: a reduction in the trade
barriers produces an increase in the comovements in all the three macroeconomic variables (con-
sumption, investment and output). On the other hand, the model fail to give the quantitative
increase in comovements we observe in the data. This could suggest that a reduction in the
trade barriers it is not a perfect proxy for all the changes a trade agreement means.meant One
missing link we think could be the financial integration of Mexico.
We therefore think it would be interesting for future research to find empirical evidence of
Mexico’s financial integration after signing the North American Free Trade Agreement. It is
our belief that, enriching the international business cycle model so that to account not only for
reduction in the cost of trade but also for the financial liberalization would provide predictions
that are closer to the empirical evidence.
Maria Bejan
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8 Appendix 1: Data description
Data used to compute correlations in consumption, investment and output is taken from
OECD Quarterly National Account and International Monetary Fund (International Financial
Statistics). From OECD, Main Economic Indicators we took quarterly data for weekly hours
of work and we use it to calculate a proxy for labor used in production for the case of United
States. For Mexico the data I use comes basically from INEGI and it was provided to me by
Felipe Meza.
Consumption in this model is computed as the sum between private and government con-
sumptions and investment like gross fixed capital formation plus changes in inventories. Then,
in order to compute the stock of capital we take the quarterly depreciation rate equal to 2.5%.
9 Appendix 2: Empirical evidence
Figure 1. Correlations Mexico – USA
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Figure 2. Correlations Canada – Mexico 
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Note: Correlations are computed over a 5-year moving window. Smooth line represents the HP 
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Figure 3. Correlations USA – Canada 
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Note: Correlations are computed over a 5-year moving window. Smooth line represents the HP 
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TABLE 1. Empirical evidence 
Corr / NAFTA Before After 
 Mexico – USA 
corr (c1, c2) -0.28 0.32 
corr (i1, i2) -0.40 0.58 
corr (y1, y2) -0.19 0.56 
 Mexico – Canada 
corr (c1, c2) -0.14 0.43 
corr (i1, i2) -0.55 0.71 
corr (y1, y2) -0.38 0.34 
 
 USA – Canada 
corr (c1, c2) 0.71 0.72 
corr (i1, i2) 0.38 0.46 
corr (y1, y2) 0.92 0.47 
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts 
Note:  c = consumption, i = investment, y = output. All the variables are Hodrick-Prescott-filtered with a 
          smoothing parameter of 1600. 
         The periods “before” and “after” corresponds to the following quarters: 
          México – USA: 1985:1 – 1993:4, 1994:1 – 2002:4 
          Canada – Mexico: 1987:1 – 1993:4, 1994:1 – 2000:4 
          USA – Canada: 1987:1 – 1993:4, 1994:1 – 2000:4 
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10 Appendix 3: Trade data
This appendix contains comparative trade statistics for the US, Mexico and Canada. The data
used is from Krueger (1999).
The next graph shows how in 1994 the percentage of trade USA-CAN of the total trade of
USA decreased instead of increase.
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The next graphs represent a comparative study in order to highlight the diﬀerence between
the importance of the US and Canada in Mexico’s trade. The exports/imports of MEX to/from
USA and CAN are represented as the percentage of total exports/imports of Mexico.
Some Business Cycle Consequences of Trade Agreements: The Case of the North American Free Trade Agreement
EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/03 © 2007 Maria Bejan 17
0.05
10.05
20.05
30.05
40.05
50.05
60.05
70.05
80.05
90.05
100.05
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Mexico: exports 
(percentage of total exports of MEX)
Exports MEX --> USA
Exports MEX --> CAN
0.05
10.05
20.05
30.05
40.05
50.05
60.05
70.05
80.05
90.05
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Imports MEX <-- USA
Imports MEX <-- CAN
Mexico: imports
 (pecentage of total imports of MEX)
11 Appendix 4: Calibration for Armington aggregator
This appendix describe in detail how we calibrate the parameters for Armington aggregator:
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods and the weight every country give to
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its domestically produced good.
• Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods: α from Armington aggre-
gator:
From first order conditions for intermediate goods we impose the condition that the sum of
Armington aggregator to be 1:
(1− ω1)a−α1 Gα1 = qa1 =⇒ ω1 = 1− qa1(
a1
G1
)α
ω1(1− τ)1−αb−α1 Gα1 = qb1 =⇒ ω1 = qb1(
b1
G1
)α(1− τ)α−1
(1− ω2)b−α2 Gα2 = qb2 =⇒ ω2 = 1− qb2(
b2
G2
)α
ω2(1− τ)1−αa−α2 Gα2 = qa2 =⇒ ω2 = qa2(
a2
G2
)α(1− τ)α−1
Taking into account that in steady state we have constant share of imports in output, we can
compute
a1
G1
=
1− s1
qa1
and
b1
G1
=
s1
qb1
,
a2
G2
=
s2
qa2
and
b2
G2
=
1− s2
qb2
Therefore
• — for the first country we have a coeﬃcient α satisfying
1− qa1(
1− s1
qa1
)α = qb1(
s1
qa1
)α(1− τ)α−1
— for the second country we have a coeﬃcient α satisfying
1− qb2(
1− s2
qb2
)α = qa2(
s2
qb2
)α(1− τ)α−1
Therefore we have in both countries α like a function of τ .
• Coeﬃcients for Armington aggregator (weights):
The functional form we use for Armington aggregator is
G(ai, bi) = ((1− ω)a1−αi + ω(1− τ)1−αb
1−α
i )
1
1−α
In order to calibrate the coeﬃcient ω we start from the imports share of output, ratio calibrated
with the existing data. Therefore, if we denote this share by s we have that
s1 =
qb1b1
p1G(a1, b1)
, s2 =
qa2a2
p2G(b2, a2)
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Since we normalized both prices of final goods with 1, we have that p1 = p2 = 1.
We will compute the coeﬃcient only for the first economy since for the second one will
be completely symmetric taking into account the symmetry of our system. From the cost
minimization problem in the final good production, we have:
min(qa1a1 + q
b
1b1)
s.t.(1− ω)a1−α1 + ω(1− τ)1−αb1−α1 = G1−α1
First order conditions:
qa1 = λ(1− ω)(1− α)a−α1
qb1 = λω(1− α)(1− τ)1−αb−α1
¾
=⇒ ( b1
a1
)α =
qa1
qb1
ω(1− τ)1−α
1− ω =⇒
=⇒ b1
a1
= (
qa1
qb1
ω(1− τ)1−α
1− ω )
1/α
Now, from the share of imports we will get the coeﬃcients:
s1 =
qb1b1
p1G(a1,b1)
p1G(a1, b1) = qa1a1 + q
b
1b1
)
⇒ s1 =
qb1b1
qa1a1 + q
b
1b1
s1 =
1
qa1
qb1
a1
b1 + 1
=
1
qa1
qb1
(
qa1
qb1
ω(1−τ)1−α
1−ω )
−1/α + 1
⇒
⇒ ω
1− ω = [(
1
s1
− 1) ∗ (q
a
1(1− τ)
qb1
)
1−α
α ]−α =⇒
=⇒ ω1 =
[( 1s1 − 1) ∗ (
qa1 (1−τ)
qb1
)
1−α
α ]−α
1 + [( 1s1 − 1) ∗ (
qa1 (1−τ)
qb1
)
1−α
α ]−α
=
[(1− s1) ∗ ( q
a
1 (1−τ)
qb1
)
1−α
α ]−α
s1 + [(1− s1) ∗ ( q
a
1 (1−τ)
qb1
)
1−α
α ]−α
in the first country
ω2 =
[( 1s2 − 1) ∗ (
qb2(1−τ)
qa2
)
1−α
α ]−α
1 + [( 1s2 − 1) ∗ (
qb2(1−τ)
qa2
)
1−α
α ]−α
=
[(1− s2) ∗ (q
b
2(1−τ)
qa2
)
1−α
α ]−α
s2 + [(1− s2) ∗ ( q
b
2(1−τ)
qa2
)
1−α
α ]−α
in the second country
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